Idealistic Strategic Planning

by Lieutenant Colonel Michael Bell, US Army, Retired

Strategic planning has become extremely important in government organizations. Unfortunately, many do not understand what strategic planning really is, nor do they have an idea about how to begin. Vice President Al Gore recently said, "At the beginning of fiscal 1998, after learning from the pilot programs, all federal agencies must develop 5-year strategic plans linked . . . to measurable outcomes."[1]

Returning recently from a meeting with an official from an activity at my installation, I was struck with the concept of how little understanding we have of the process of strategic planning. This particular meeting's purpose was to respond to a request for facilitation of a "strategic planning" workshop. As I listened to what the official had planned for his organization—refining goals, objectives and tasks for the next one to three years—I realized it was not strategic planning but some form of long-range planning.

I commend the organization for taking the time to develop a plan, but it was not strategic planning. Strategic planning consists of creating a future for an organization by discovering organizational purpose (why do we exist?), developing organizational values, creating a vision for the future and developing strategies to achieve that future state.

My experience working with leaders of major organizations indicates there are several reasons for preferring long-range rather than strategic planning. First and foremost is the "make it happen on my watch" orientation. This creates a tendency to plan only for the tenure of the reigning senior leader. Whether his tour is for two, three or more years, plans will only endure for the length of the leader's tenure and will change as rapidly as do the leaders.

True strategic planning sessions focus on tomorrow and how things could be better than the way they are. We are comfortable with the daily problems associated with work and gain much satisfaction from doing "things" daily. But how much effort is directed toward a future state 10 to 25 years hence?

Trying to create or describe a future state is often outside the "comfort zone" and written off as unrealistic or unachievable; thus, no attempts are made to plan for the future. Instead, the focus is on where we are today and how we should deal with today's problems. Solutions to today's problems are still focused on the present state.

Long-range planning depends heavily on our experience of the recent past and our sense of what is realistic. This keeps us in a present state of mind. Strategic planning has little to do with past experiences or daily tasks and problems. Long-range planning, sometimes called operations planning, is quite different and begins with today's resources, problems, demands, constraints and opportunities. It uses a series of extrapolations of past events modified by judgment and apparent necessity to create a picture of what can be expected in the future.

Both kinds of planning might cover the same time frame and involve strategy development. But, while long-range planning starts where you are and works forward, strategic planning begins with the future and works backward. Both perspectives are useful, although they frequently result in different and even contradictory views of the future.

Making the Best Decisions Today

Strategic planning presumes the future and is based on the assumption that we can create a future that is desirable, one that is different from

*Organizational Leaders are Goal Oriented

our present and one that is ideal. Unfortunately, traditionalists resist true strategic planning as a waste of time and effort. They describe it as "pie in the sky" and unrealistic thinking. It would be nice to have at least one structure to follow that would afford the organization the opportunity to create its future and which might transcend senior leader tenure and love of the present state.

Strategic planning is a normative approach to thinking about the future. You create a dream, then make it happen. It is quite literally inventing the future by imagining it first, then working to bring the imagined into reality. Everything the organization does or does not do is based on the dream and the plan to make it happen.

Clearly, there are several ways of looking at the future. One is to look at what is real; another looks at what is ideal. The transformation process organizations might undertake toward creating the desired future is imbedded in the strategic planning process.

Realistic strategic planning begins with what one really wants to happen, unencumbered by life tasks, problems or limitations. Organizational members describe what the future will be with respect to purpose (why we exist), culture, environment, demands, constraints and opportunities. Organizational values are discussed in terms of behaviors that must be demonstrated and which will facilitate achieving the future. All of these culminate in a vision of the future. Mission clarification, in terms of what we should do and should not do, is discussed. This process enables us to put our vision into action. All of our efforts, resources and energies are then focused toward the vision.

From Vision to Action

There are several steps in the Vision-to-Action Process. They include determining organizational values, purpose and vision; analyzing the mission; and determining goals, objectives and tasks.[2]

Organizational values. To determine the organization's values, members must reach agreement on how they will behave with and toward one another and what it is they value. The process requires they first share personal values; for example, family, religion, security or honesty. By sharing personal values, they prepare themselves to discover and define things they collectively value, such as successful, structured, powerful, caring and meaningful work.

Because values tend to be abstract, members must reach agreement on some form of statement to describe the behaviors associated with the values. These "normative statements" lend clarity to the behaviors we each expect and define our actions in relation to the values. Without normative statements, we have nothing more than "bumper sticker" statements.

Organizations that do not define their values leave much to misinterpretation. Leaders and followers alike are accused of not "walking the talk," so to speak. Normative statements provide a behavior that is observable.

Organizational purpose. Once the organization has created and defined those things it collectively values, it must answer the question, "Why do we exist?" Purpose places everything into context for the organization. A statement of organizational purpose should quickly and clearly convey how the organization fulfills its need. Purpose need only be meaningful and inspirational to people inside the organization; it need not be exciting to all outsiders.

We should not do anything in conflict with our purpose. All our resources and efforts should support our purpose. The purpose should be unique and enduring. It should separate us from other organizations. Also, it must be something more than "We serve to perform service X to customer Y."

Many confuse purpose with mission. Missions have a finish line. Purpose defines "why"; mission defines "what." The Civilian Leadership Training Division, part of the Center for Army Leadership, defines its purpose as, "Cutting Edge Leadership Services for America." The statement transcends the present state and focuses organizational members to provide a cultural change in the way leadership is presented and how it is executed.

Organizational vision. A vision is a picture of the future we seek to create described in the present tense as if it were happening now. A statement of "our vision" shows where we want to go and what we will be like when we get there. There are many ways to create a vision. The leader might provide the vision, or members might create one. Both will work, but the latter provides more ownership by organizational members.

Why bother to create a vision? Many realists see this process as a waste of time and effort. What senior leaders really want is for their organizations to remain viable and productive, and we cannot do it without the so-called "soft stuff." People, what they value individually and collectively, as well as the vision is what energizes leaders. It is not just the work.

Without a vision, we truly just react and are not in a place to be proactive. So why bother? There are several reasons.

- Because we want superior performance. We talk of self-managed work teams or empowering people, but no matter what words we use, they express the same fundamental purpose—getting the best performance out of each person.
- To improve quality. Vision allows members of an organization to commit to providing total quality in all they do.
- For our customers. If we can genuinely satisfy customers and be

Lieutenant Colonel David M. Bell, US Army, Retired, works in the Civilian Leadership Training Division, Center for Army Leadership, US Army Command and General Staff College. He received a B.A. from Texas A&I University. He served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States. Beyond facilitating the Organizational Leadership for Executives Course, he also serves as a consultant to major Army commands in the development of vision and strategies for their organizations.

a real resource to them, we can all feel great about the service we provide.

- For an energized, committed organization. With drawdowns and reduced resources, it is important to provide a clear vision to employees that will energize them and make them willing to commit to the organization. Without doing so, employees cannot make the contributions of which they are capable. Most want to contribute to the fullest extent; the vision gives them something to which they can contribute.
- To lead the organization through periods of change. If there is one thing we face continuously, it is change. People with a vision react more quickly in a changing environment, because they can anticipate what is going to occur—which is different from trying to predict the future. Vision allows us to create the changes we want to occur.
- Because the times demand it. Think back five years. What were you doing? Think back 10 years. Now think ahead 10 years. Can you do it? You had better! By developing your vision you will actually be creating what you want your future to look like, instead of merely reacting to it.
- Because we want it. We each bring our own level of commitment and presence to this process. But the most compelling reason I can give for developing a vision is because of wanting to work in an organization that has one.[3]

Leaders by themselves are never on time or on budget. Managers by themselves never do anything innovative like creating a vision. Organizational leaders should understand there is a difference in their work and management's work. Leaders owe the organization a clear picture of the future it wants to create and clear strategies backed with logic to enable their achievement. Management can then create specific steps, timetables and budgets to implement strategies, clearly focusing on the outcomes desired and the necessary budget. Not allowing budget constraints and daily problems to cloud planning efforts is important.

Once the team creates a vision, it must be put into action. All leaders' and managers' efforts should be focused on the vision. If efforts do not support the vision and strategies, the initiative is not resourced. Priorities might change, but this should not affect the purpose or vision. If there is a clear purpose and vision, people will see the connection to the statements and ideals. In the Army, civilians are key, because they hold the organization's institutional knowledge. They provide the continuity and connection to the vision.

Creating a vision that will withstand changes in priority and leadership is important, as is educating new leaders as they come on board. The Vision to Action Model takes into account all aspects that affect planning and vision. It provides a methodology to move from "just words" to a plan infused with action and energy.

Mission analysis. Viewing the organization from a systems perspective, we see that the mission usually comes from the environment; that is, the higher organization. We must take the time to analyze the things we do that truly support the purpose and vision and those that do not. "Shadow missions"—things we do that consume all our time but which do not support the mission—must be eliminated.

The mission, with the vision, helps us develop strategies to close the gap between what we want and what we now have. We must look at the organization's culture and climate to develop strategies. We must first describe the problem. Culture permeates all we do and is subtle in itself. Climate is readily understood, while culture is misunderstood. We must describe both as we want them to be in the future and how we know they currently are.

Goals. Organizational leaders and the organizations they lead should be goal oriented. Most of us tend to be task or daily routine oriented. Task orientation gives us great satisfaction of accomplishment, but goals move us toward the future. If leaders are not goal focused, who will be? Without idealistic goals, we are only living day to day. In the absence of shared goals, people tend to create their own, which can be contrary to the organization's.

Objectives and tasks. Almost all divisions, branches, teams and groups work on organizational goals and create goals for themselves. These can also be classified as objectives. Teams and groups create measurable objectives to support an organization's goals. These are then taken to the organization and made part of the strategic plan. This creates a sense of ownership and commitment.

Finally, individuals work on tasks that need to be accomplished in support of stated objectives and goals. Employees should be allowed to contribute at all levels. Their ability to do so is a result of their competence and commitment and will give them a personal investment in the organization. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Vice President Al Gore, quoted in "Government Performance Management Review Act from Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less," Report of the National Performance Review, 7 September 1993, revised 10 September 1993, 73.
2. Developed by David M. Bell, Civilian Leadership Training Division, Center for Army Leadership, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1991.
3. MG Robert Orton, opening remarks, Strategic Planning Conference, US Army Training and Support Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 1995.

Green Fields Beyond

by Lieutenant Colonel Drew Bennett, US Marine Corps

We shall attack through the mud and blood of the trenches and to the green fields beyond.

—British concept for tanks during World War I[1]

The ongoing revolution in military affairs assures us that tomorrow's world will be radically different from the world we know. To prevent our military from becoming obsolete, Joint Vision 2010 describes a framework for dealing with the challenges of the future and provides a template for the evolution of our Armed Forces. The vision, based on

emerging technology, prescribes information superiority and uses four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full-dimensional protection. This vision foresees joint forces using technology to dominate an opponent across the range of military operations; that is, full-spectrum dominance.

While Joint Vision 2010 acknowledges the importance of quality forces in terms of people, leader development, training and readiness and first-rate equipment, it does not address how that quality force will react to the unexpected. In the rapidly changing security environment, joint combat readiness depends on how our forces solve problems. Unfortunately, when it comes to solving military problems, many serving in joint billets spend too much time attempting to sell their services. Quality forces must evolve beyond this myopic thinking to maximize force capabilities in 2010. Joint forces are certain to encounter the unexpected. Therefore, in addition to developing the technologically advanced operational capabilities outlined in Joint Vision 2010, they must develop a certain ethos. The future will demand more than just a high-tech military; the United States needs a joint force of problem solvers.

The concept, development and employment of British tanks to break the costly stalemate of trench warfare during World War I is one example. The early history of the tank provides useful insight into joint problem solving. Lessons from this case study can enhance the human dimension of Joint Vision 2010 and increase future combat readiness.

The Tank Concept

Throughout history many leaders attempted to combine mobility, protection and firepower. Examples include Ramses III's chariots, Hannibal's elephants, Attila's battle wagons and Leonardo Da Vinci's armored shell. Modern tanks became feasible with the development of the combustion engine and improvements in steel plating, prompting several people to advocate the use of tanks. However, it took more than just concepts and technology to move from feasibility to actuality.

In 1914, events brought together problem solvers who had the drive and vision to push beyond concept to reality. British mining engineer Hugh Marriott visualized the military potential of the Holt tracked vehicle after seeing it demonstrated in Antwerp, Belgium. He passed his observations to British engineer officer Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Swinton, who believed the Holt could be converted into a trench-crossing machine that could be used to break the deadlock on the Western Front. While on leave, he passed his observations to Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defense Colonel Maurice Hankey. They agreed to forward the idea.

On 26 December 1914, Hankey wrote a memorandum summarizing his idea. This document became known as the Boxing Day or Hankey memorandum.[2] Hankey suggested using armored vehicles to carry troops, smash trenches and overrun machinegun positions. First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill read the Boxing Day memorandum and, on 5 January 1915, wrote to Prime Minister Herbert Asquith requesting a committee be formed to research the idea. This request was approved, and the Admiralty Landships Committee was formed.[3]

During World War I, the military was searching for ways to move quickly beyond the stalemate in the trenches to the "green fields beyond." This deadlock was not identified until after the start of the war, and even then many senior military and political leaders believed that committing another million men would be the solution. This group was able to conceive only of top-down solutions that reinforced the current paradigm.

The idea of the tank resulted from a different way of thinking. The concept was just as much a bottom-up idea advocated by enthusiasts seeking sponsors as it was a top-down idea from senior planners and staff officers soliciting feasibility input. More important, it was a major shift from the contemporary paradigm. Instead of using more infantry or more artillery to achieve greater attrition, the tank provided a unique solution focused on mobility.

Tank Development

Initial development of the tank fell to the British Navy and Naval Air Service until the Landships Committee was formed. Even then, there was little support from the War Office. It was not until 1 July 1915 that the War Office submitted specifications and requirements for the proposed tanks. On 30 July 1915, design and production requests were sent to William Tritton, the managing director of the company that manufactured the Foster-Daimier tractor.

In September, responsibility for the tank project was turned over to the Ministry of Munitions. The first prototype, "Little Willie," did not meet requirements and experiments continued. The second prototype, "Mother," was successfully demonstrated on 2 February 1916. Secretary of State for War Earl Kitchener reportedly remarked that it was a "pretty toy." The War Office ordered 50. After a successful demonstration to King George V, the order was increased to 100. The tank, now designated the Mark I, would undergo numerous modifications based on performance in the field, evolving into the Mark VIII before the end of the war.[4]

Lack of resources hampered Germany's tank production. Committed earlier to building a blue-water fleet along with an armada of submarines, German industry was exhausted. The tightening British blockade aggravated this condition. Also, 8th Army Commander and later

Lieutenant Colonel Drew A. Bennett, US Marine Corps, is battalion commander, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, 29 Palms, California. He received a B.A. from Tulane University, an M.S. from Golden Gate University and a Ph.D. from Texas A&M University. He is a graduate of the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, the School of Advanced Warfighting and the Armed Forces Staff College. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States, Lebanon and Kuwait. He is a frequent contributor to military journals.

Chief of the General Staff Paul von Hindenburg did not like the tank idea. Although the Germans did produce about 20 tanks, they were more interested in using captured tanks and developing antitank weapons.[5]

Tank Employment

During the war, many British officers wrote papers on tank employment and advocated ideas such as using large numbers of armored and motorized "heavy rollers" or "destroyers" equipped with machineguns in successive surprise attacks, supported by infantry, artillery and air, to breach wire, clear trenches, destroy machinegun positions, attack headquarters and fight other tanks.[6] Unfortunately, their advice was ignored by the commander of the British Expeditionary Force, Field Marshal General Douglas Haig, the General Staff planners and local commanders who executed the operations. Haig viewed the war in Napoleonic terms—a breakout followed by a horse-cavalry pursuit of a defeated army.[7]

Similar to artillery or engineers, tanks were generally seen as auxiliary support for infantry. Tank crews were often rushed to the battlefield without proper training, coordination or maintenance. On 15 September 1916, strategic surprise evaporated in an attack on the Somme when only 49 tanks reached the starting point. A mobile reserve of tanks was never formed; they were parceled out to infantry units. Cavalry either outran the tanks or were cut to pieces. Infantry often failed to protect their tanks, sending them to take and hold objectives on their own.

The first major tank victory was the Battle of Cambrai on 20 November 1917. Originally planned as a raid, the Cambrai offensive employed over 300 tanks. The attack was a tactical surprise in that it did not have the usual extensive artillery preparation. Also, tanks and infantry extensively trained before the battle. At the end of the first day, the tanks had broken through the four enemy trenches and penetrated 4 miles into the enemy rear, unheard-of success at that time. Unfortunately, without a tank reserve and at the limit of their operational reach, the Allies were vulnerable to a counterattack that recaptured most of the terrain. Drawing the wrong conclusion altogether, several senior commanders blamed the tanks for their failure to hold the ground they had uncovered.

The most successful World War I tank attack was the Battle of Amiens on 8 August 1918, which has been credited with breaking the confidence and will of the German Supreme command.[8] Finally, some of the lessons learned and advice from the "problem solvers" were implemented. Over 400 heavy and medium tanks supported by supply tanks and gun carriers were used. The tanks had wireless radio sets and fought with air, artillery and infantry in a well-integrated combined arms effort.

Why did the British have such trouble employing a weapon capable of ending the war? For one thing, the tank and tank corps were perceived to threaten the infantry's existence. This belief was compounded by the narrow view of officers who were trained for and remained in the same regiment and who, therefore, had little experience of anything outside their area of interest. While we tend to idolize the stability and cohesion of the "regimental tradition," its sterility of thinking and dogmatic adherence to status quo significantly hindered tank evolution.

Another factor that retarded acceptance of the tank was the failure to accept advice from below, articulate it and apply it as doctrine. The Germans did not have this problem. German Chief of Staff of the 8th Army Lieutenant General Erich Ludendorff—later the quartermaster general—often went to front-line troops for solutions to problems. Under his direction, information from his visits and after-action reports was used to create a new doctrine for the defense.[9]

The British also believed that winning the war was always just around the corner, one push away. Haig was willing to give up the surprise created by using the few tanks available because he believed those few might be all that were needed to finally break through to defeat the exhausted German army. However, an inflexible military system locked in tradition found it difficult to incorporate the new weapons or to change tactics. The result was that the Allies fought a costly war for one or maybe even two years longer than necessary.

Joint Forces Relevance to Combat Readiness

British attempts to use the tank in World War I illustrate the unexpected problems an armed force can face when changing technologies, doctrine, tactics and force structure in a joint environment where there are competing demands and limited resources. At the strategic level, the tank's concept and development marked a victory of innovation over bureaucracy. At operational and tactical levels, it was often a failure of change to overcome tradition. Several lessons from this historical example apply to the joint forces' future combat readiness:

- Most problems impact the entire joint force, not just one service.
- Problem identification and solutions can come from anywhere.
- The joint force must integrate solutions throughout the entire force.

Joint Vision 2010 says, "The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team." Rarely will a problem only affect one service. The more we synchronize joint service efforts to improve overall effectiveness, the more the services become dependent on, not independent of, one another. Even in World War I, Germany's priority of resources to their navy and the British blockade of German ports adversely affected their tank development. The greatest British successes came with coordinated tank and air employment. Today's symbiotic relationship among land, sea and air forces will increase as the range, guidance and lethality of weapons increase.

Because military problems affect all services, joint forces must access all available talent when confronting a pressing issue. However, as the pace of operations increases, the time available to identify and solve

problems decreases. Even so, this process must be thorough—top-down, bottom-up and side-to-side. Service parochialism can be fatal; as resources decline we must fight the instinct to protect service turf. Instead, we must produce the most efficient and effective solutions.

Problems that affect the entire force require solutions that apply to the entire force. If future joint forces are to be more effective and responsive due to significantly improved command and control based on fused, all-source, real-time intelligence, greater interoperability and more detailed synchronization, we must have a system that integrates these throughout the force. Solutions that are not fully developed and integrated will not resolve the problem.

Relevance to Joint Vision 2010

Incorporating these lessons in preparing for the future requires a joint environment that encourages problem solving. Regardless of how much we increase joint operational capabilities, we will still encounter the unexpected and need people able to look beyond the "regimental tradition" of service parochialism. In the race to keep up with emerging technologies, we must not forget the human dimension. More and more technology will not win the next war, just as more and more men did not win World War I. The next conflict will be won by innovative and determined people who use technology to overcome unexpected obstacles.

While Joint Vision 2010 provides a direction toward which the services can evolve, the services also need direction for developing future leaders and a joint ethos.[10] Without diluting service traditions or cohesion, joint force members must transcend past perspectives to reach the most effective, efficient and widely applicable solutions. To this end, Joint Vision 2010 should articulate the joint ethos—the distinguishing characteristic of all joint service members—of problem solving. That would be the first step in orienting service members and separate military services toward the attitude required to achieve full-spectrum dominance.[11]

Developing a joint force able to think out of the box, identify problems, find solutions and integrate them on the battlefield should be a part of the joint vision and would greatly influence the future combat readiness of joint forces. We know we must keep up with technology and update tactics, techniques and procedures to get to the green fields beyond. When confronted with the mud and blood of future warfare, the attitude of our force will determine whether we reach our goal. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Attributed to LTC J.F.C. Fuller, this is the unofficial motto of the Royal Tank Corps, whose colors and regimental tie contain brown, red and green to represent the "mud," "blood" and "fields."
2. In Great Britain, the day after Christmas is known as Boxing Day because "boxes" or presents are given to errand boys, mail carriers and other employees.
3. Guy Hartcup, *The War of Invention: Scientific Development*, 1914-1918 (New York: Brassey's, 1988), 82-83.
4. Ibid., 85-86.
5. Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, *Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theory of War—1904-1945* (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1995), 137; B.H. Liddell Hart, *The Tanks*, Vol 1 (New York: Praeger, 1959), 45; Hartcup, 91.
6. J.F.C. Fuller, *"Plan 1919," Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1984), 321, 329-33; Liddell Hart, 24-25, 57-59, 92-94.
7. Allan R. Millet, ed., *Military Effectiveness*, Vol I *The First World War* (Boston: Unwin and Hyman, 1987), 20.
8. Liddell Hart, 185.
9. Timothy T. Lupfer, "The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War," *Leavenworth Papers*, No 4, Fort Leavenworth, 1981, 8-21.
10. Howard D. Graves and Don M. Snider, "Emergence of the Joint Officer," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn 1996, 57.
11. Liddell Hart, 13; Hartcup, 81-82; Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, *Armor* (New York: Praeger, 1960), 141.

MR Almanac

Army National Guard: Korean War Mobilization

by Captain William M. Donnelly, US Army Reserve

Between 1950 and 1952, 138,600 Guardsmen made up 43 percent of the Army force. The US Army National Guard (ARNG), including eight divisions, three regimental combat teams (RCTs), 98 battalions, 67 companies and 94 detachments, received mobilization orders in 1950.

Like the regular Army and the organized reserve corps, the ARNG was not ready for war; all had serious problems with manpower, equipment and training. The performance of guard units was like that of regular and reserve units—a few excelled, most were good to adequate, and a few failed. And, like regulars and reserves, a guard unit's performance rested on leadership, training and acceptance of service.[1]

The 1950 Army National Guard

In June 1950, the best guard units were cadres that could quickly expand into combat-ready units. Because the Army had mobilized or deleted every guard unit during World War II and discharged all guardsmen afterward, the guard had to reorganize and begin training every unit in the new troop list. Congress and President Harry S. Truman provided enough funding to fill only 350,000 of the 617,500 positions in the postwar ARNG, forcing the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to place units on reduced tables of organization (TOs).

As with regulars, most guard units did not have full complements of required equipment, and what they did have was often obsolete or worn out. Army planning, based on World War II experience, assumed there would be sufficient time for

mobilized guard units to receive enough recalled reservists, trained draftees and equipment to bring them to full strength and to conduct adequate predeployment training.[2]

In 1950, the quality of unit leadership was uneven. Most general and senior field grade officers had extensive guard or reserve service or active-duty experience from one or both world wars. Many had graduated from special guard versions of Army post-commissioning schooling. The majority of company grade and some junior field grade officers had received commissions during World War II, but often not in their postwar guard branches. Few had attended the "associate" versions of basic and advanced courses, and those lacking wartime service in their branch had experience only in weekly drills and two weeks of summer field training.

Many units with links to the 1940 troop list retained a cadre of proven officers; units without such links often had trouble finding trained, experienced officers. In some units, World War II veterans dominated senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) ranks, and the majority of enlisted men were drawn from those who had been too young to participate in World War II. These recruits brought great enthusiasm but also created problems, especially personnel turbulence.[3]

The young enlistees' greatest effect was on unit training. The NGB's three-year training plan was keyed to a three-year enlistment tour and focused on individual soldier skills. While some units held additional drills for staff training, the two-week summer field training was often the only opportunity for staff and unit collective training.

An Army Field Forces (AFF) report noted that with continuous personnel turnover, "it is doubtful if the training and overall efficiency of the guard will ever reach its desired standards." Variations in competence among officers and NCOs, equipment shortages, inadequate armories, few training areas, failure to fill all regular Army instructor billets and time constraints further complicated training management.[4]

Mobilization and the Manpower Shortage

During July 1950, the Army stripped its general reserve in the Continental United States to provide Eighth Army reinforcements and replacements to be deployed to Korea. By early August, the cupboard was nearly bare. The Army had to order thousands of inactive and volunteer reservists to Korea. Planning had allotted many of these reservists to mobilized guard units, so most units, except those slotted in autumn 1950 for Korea, did not receive all the reservists needed to fill junior officer, NCO and technical specialist positions. Because the training base could not expand fast enough to serve guard units as well as the Eighth Army, almost all guard units received untrained draftees for enlisted fillers.[5]

Under an extension of the 30 June 1950 Selective Service Act, guard units could be ordered into federal service for 21 months. Concerned about economic and political repercussions, the Army staff worried that an already overstretched Army could not supply the necessary equipment, fillers and training support. Some doubted guard units could be ready in time to influence events in Korea. Another concern was that guard units sent to Korea would be unavailable for other contingencies. Because of the continuing bad news from Korea, the need to rebuild the general reserve and the need to build an antiaircraft artillery (AAA) defense of the zone of the interior (ZI) should the war expand into World War III, Army leaders concluded they would need to use at least a portion of the guard.[6]

The AAA units were predominate in the first two increments of alerted units.[7] Other nondivision units included field artillery, maintenance, truck, engineer, signal and several other types of battalion and group headquarters companies and detachments. The period between alert and induction was three to four weeks. The Army G3 earmarked a number of non-AAA units during August and September, but the Army's success at the battle of Inchon led planners to delay their deployment.

As the Eighth Army moved deeper into North Korea, six guard truck companies and two truck battalion headquarters received orders to deploy as reinforcements for the sagging logistic system. Chinese intervention emphasized the Eighth Army's shortage of nondivision units, and in December 1950 and early January 1951, nine field artillery battalions, six combat engineer battalions, three bridge companies, three maintenance companies and three headquarters detachments from the guard received orders for Korea.[8]

Many regulars doubted guard officers could prepare and lead a division, and they feared political turmoil would result if a guard division suffered heavy casualties. The depleted general reserve overrode these concerns, and on 31 July, Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins ordered four divisions and two RCTs into federal service to cover base areas such as Iceland and Alaska. Collins did not want to violate the divisions' integrity—with the risk of causing a political storm—to provide units for this mission when separate RCTs were available. Army field forces had recommended which guard divisions to select, ranking them on the basis of their personnel status, training status and the AFF's evaluation of their leadership. However, only two of the four divisions were to come from the AFF list

Captain William M. Donnelly, US Army Reserve, works at the US Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC. He received a B.A. and an M.A. from the University of Michigan and a Ph.D. from Ohio State University. He has served in a variety of positions in the Continental United States, including battery executive officer, assistant S3 and battery commander, 3d Battalion, 92d Field Artillery, Akron, Ohio; commander, 660th Transportation Company, Cadiz, Ohio; and supply and services officer, 423d Corps Support Battalion, Warren, Ohio. His active duty service was with the 2d Infantry Division and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized).

because Collins and Secretary of the Army Frank Pace Jr. believed spreading the burden equally across the nation was important.[9]

Young enlisted guardsmen looked forward to the adventure and excitement of active duty. The many World War II veterans, most only then hitting their stride as civilians, reacted with apprehension and resignation softened some by the comfort of serving with friends and neighbors. Many guardsmen agreed with 45th Infantry Division commander Major General James C. Styron: "There's a rich heritage in the Thunderbird history, and although it may be a dubious honor, it still is an honor to be considered one of the nation's best outfits."[10] Senior guardsmen and supportive politicians expressed traditional concerns over the use of the units because it would be necessary to break up guard divisions, replace senior guard officers with regulars and strip guardsmen from their units, violating the slogan that had become the guard's major selling point: "Go With Those You Know."

Editorial opinion generally viewed partial mobilization as a necessary, if unwelcome, development and celebrated the citizen-soldier tradition. Partial mobilization created problems for guardsmen not mobilized; some employers would not hire those who might soon be in federal service.[11]

Before induction, some units promoted officers and enlisted men or commissioned NCOs as second lieutenants. Not all regulars thought this helpful, believing it moved some guardsmen beyond their level of competence.[12] The alert notice authorized units to run recruiting campaigns. The success of these campaigns varied, but only a few units reached full TO strength. Losses usually cancelled out gains. The guard's success in enlisting younger men backfired. Army regulations prohibited induction of soldiers younger than 17. The 45th Infantry Division had to discharge 1,218 soldiers—16 percent of its enlisted strength. The next most common reason for discharge was failing the induction physical.[13]

Other losses occurred because of deferments and the extensive confusion about deferments. Units often lacked copies of appropriate Army regulations and received conflicting guidance from higher echelons. Governors and adjutants general usually tried to insulate the process by appointing a board of officers to hear requests. These measures did not prevent appeals to politicians for assistance, but governors usually declined to override a board's decision.[14]

Postmobilization Training and Turbulence

The AFF plan for units' postmobilization training had two phases. On arrival at a training site, units were to conduct basic training for junior enlisted guardsmen, prepare officers and NCOs as future trainers, integrate reservists and regular fillers, send guardsmen to various Army schools and receive draftee fillers. Nondivision units were then to conduct the Army Training Program (ATP); divisions were to follow the AFF Master Training Program (MTP). The ATP and MTP began with individual soldier skills and moved through collective training at each echelon, with progress measured at each echelon using Army Training Tests (ATTs). The MTP concluded with combined arms exercises at RCT and division levels.[15]

Units encountered multiple sources of friction during postmobilization training. Most locations lacked adequate buildings, supplies, staffs and ranges and were not prepared to act as training sites.[16] Some staffs saw guard units as convenient sources of manpower. Fort Lewis, Washington, stripped 40 percent of the 300th Armored Field Artillery (FA) Battalion's enlisted strength to fill units going to Korea—even though the 300th itself was also on orders for Korea—then backfilled the 300th with soldiers stripped from non-FA units. Administrative concerns crippled other units. Because the corps artillery headquarters at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, could not handle the paperwork load for 10 guard and reserve units, Fifth Army placed these units under the post commander, an infantryman with neither the experience nor staff to properly supervise artillery ATPs.[17]

Planning for postmobilization training assumed there would be a total mobilization as there had been during World War II. Thus, MTP and ATP results projected inadequate levels of equipment and repair parts. Units submitted requisitions to fill these shortages, but small stockpiles and Eighth Army's needs meant few units completed the training program with a full set of equipment and supplies. This created significant difficulties for both individual and collective training and placed extra wear on available equipment.[18]

The greatest source of friction was personnel turbulence. Units sent guard officers and NCOs to Army schools, which was a good long-term investment, but doing so left many units with a serious number of vacancies in leadership and key technical positions. Some units had to delay training until enlisted fillers trickled in. Some units began training without their fillers. The units would later have to establish ad hoc basic training elements to train and integrate new personnel.[19] Because of the Army's limited training base and the demand for replacements, many guard units became emergency supplements to its training system; after completing individual training, recruits were shipped overseas.

The relentless demand for replacements led to levies. Units usually tried to fill the levies with reservists or with their first set of enlisted fillers. In February 1951, the 28th Infantry Division lost 3,000 enlisted fillers to a levy; a month later it lost another 3,000. Sometimes a levy's requirement, such as rank or skill, forced a unit to fill it with guardsmen, which created resentment.

Other turbulence came from within as commanders sought to fill positions with the best-qualified people. In some units, commanders shuffled subordinate leaders to break up hometown connections. Some senior guard officers in divisions were transferred to positions outside the unit, replaced either by promoted guardsmen or regulars. Division commanders also relieved battalion and regimental commanders whose units failed ATTs—a painful but

necessary duty: "We dropped a number in spite of our friendship because we knew we had to have top-notch officers in every instance."[20]

Concerned about the 28th and 43d Infantry divisions' readiness to deploy to Germany as part of the NATO buildup, AFF ordered them to participate in Exercise SOUTHERN PINE, held at Camp MacKall, North Carolina. AFF observers praised the skill and discipline of individual soldiers, higher level staff work and the ability of both divisions to learn from mistakes. However, both divisions received extensive criticism of unit performance and of their combined arms operations. Observers attributed these problems to NCO and junior officer inexperience and disruptions created by levies.

The AFF recommended that both divisions conduct intensive training at battalion level and lower before deploying. AFF chief General Mark W. Clark wrote: "Naturally, when we follow our national military policy of placing our faith in our citizen units, we do not get the same results with civilians as division commanders as we do with carefully selected regulars. However, I am satisfied with both of them. Both are playing the game, working hard and, I believe, will do a good job. They have seen the light and requested the relief of certain of their key subordinates who could not measure up to their responsibilities."[21] Third Army commander Lieutenant General John R. Hodge wrote that both divisions were "basically in far better shape than were the divisions I saw in any of the 1941 maneuvers, either National guard or regular" and that they "are reasonably ready to go."[22]

Korea, Germany and the ZI

Fourteen percent of mobilized guard units served in the Far East, 11 percent deployed to Europe as part of the NATO buildup and 73 percent remained in the ZI. Those in the ZI were assigned to either the general reserve or to the Army Antiaircraft Command.[23]

Guard officers held most senior and many junior positions, and enlisted guardsmen usually leavened the greater number of draftee and reservist fillers. The nondivision units in Korea during early 1951 performed as well as their regular counterparts and provided the Eighth Army with field artillery, engineer and transportation support critical to defeating China's spring offensives.[24]

Commander of the Far East Command General Matthew B. Ridgway planned to leave the 40th and 45th Infantry divisions in Japan and transfer their soldiers into the Eighth Army as individual replacements. Collins, believing this plan would create a political storm by implying the Army did not trust its MTP to produce combat-ready units, vetoed the idea and directed the divisions to replace two regular ones in Korea. Between December 1951 and January 1952, guard divisions swapped locations and equipment with the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry divisions and remained guard in character until June 1952, when their last guardsmen rotated home.

Despite regulars' doubts, guard divisions performed as well as other US divisions in the frustrating war. The divisions were on two learning curves: one for all units new to combat and one for conditions particular to the war. Much of the latter—raiding, patrolling, field fortifications, high-angle indirect fire—had not been stressed in the MTP, but the divisions responded. They established extensive training programs, formed special patrol groups, closely supervised subordinate units and circulated lessons learned.[25]

Guard units sent to Germany joined Seventh Army's rigorous round of practice alerts; field training; large-scale, multiunit exercises; and ATTs. Despite busy training schedules, many units, especially service support units, had to battle against "garrison mentality" and "short-timer's syndrome" as guardsmen, reservists and draftees got closer to their release dates.[26]

By mid-1951, limited national mobilization, the rotation program in Korea and the NATO buildup created a severe manpower crisis. Guard units in Germany and Korea—preparing for the loss of their guardsmen, reservists and 1950 draftees—complained of the insufficient numbers and low quality of replacements. To maintain their effectiveness, divisions established internal schools, and all units created on-the-job training programs to enhance necessary skills.[27] Almost all regular, reserve and guard units in the ZI attempted to remain combat effective, but they were targeted as a rich source of trained manpower for overseas units, useful additions to the still-insufficient Army training system and convenient units in which to "store" short-timers.[28]

The press of the manpower dilemma was unrelenting. While on Exercise LONG HORN, at Fort Hood, Texas, the 163d Military Police (MP) Battalion lost seven officers and 105 enlisted men. Its commander noted that these numbers "reflected approximately the same losses the organization might have suffered in combat without replacements." Even the AAA Command was not exempt. During 1951, it had a 46-percent turnover.[33] Morale suffered. In May 1951, a warrant officer wrote that those selected to fill levies in his battalion were "not too enthusiastic about going; however, they're adopting what seems to be the only attitude to take—'What the Hell'."[29]

In 1950 and 1951, communities realized that mobilization of their units was an undesirable but necessary measure. Protests centered on perceived unfairness, which mainly concerned World War II veterans serving again on active duty, and fears that regulars would mistreat guardsmen. Among guardsmen, bitterness over this issue never approached the intensity found among involuntarily recalled inactive reservists. But, it did increase, especially among those sent overseas after the war stalemated and college draft deferments began.

The fear that regulars would mistreat guardsmen was a hardy perennial. Guardsmen and their supporters were not shy about using adjutants general or home-state politicians to redress grievances. Collins remained sensitive to political implications of using Reserve Components, but clearly, on issues considered crucial by regulars—which units to mobilize or deploy and the stripping of units—guardsmen and their advocates lost. For example,

when an Oklahoman protested orders sending his division to Japan, Styron pointed out that a guard unit in federal service was "under Army orders and will go wherever it is assigned."[30]

Today's ARNG differs in significant ways from that of 50 years ago. But, it remains the Army's reserve of combat units and is an important link between the Army and the American people. As the regular Army becomes smaller, the guard's importance increases. Should the Army be engaged in war or suffer serious casualties and reverses, we might again have to address the concerns Collins faced in Korea. ***MR***

NOTES

1. This article is based on William M. Donnelly, "Under Army Orders: The US Army National Guard During the Korean War," Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1998; John K. Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard* (New York: Macmillan, 1983), 209; National Guard Bureau (NGB), "Induction and Release of Army National Guard Units, 1950-1956," copy at the US Center of Military History, Washington, DC.

2. Command Report, Record Group 407, National Archives, College Park, Maryland (RG 407, NA); John M. Kendall, *An Inflexible Response: United States Army Manpower Mobilization Policies, 1945-1957*, Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1982, 52-77, 116-31; Mahon, 198-205.

3. Donnelly, Chapter 1.

4. NGB, "Notes and Comments for Unit Commanders—The Three-Year Training Plan," draft, Army Decimal File, Box 1102, Record Group 168, National Archives, College Park, Maryland (RG 168, NA); Inspection Report, "Report of Staff Visit to National Guard Units of Texas and Oklahoma," 11 January 1950, Box 26 (RG 337, NA).

5. James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1972, reprint 1992), 120-22; Kendall, 180-83, 206-10; Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, *Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1983* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), 94-100.

6. Schnabel, 122-23; Kendall, 172-73.

7. NGB, "Induction and Release." The AFF did not maintain the integrity of AAA groups and brigades. Instead it selected units based on unit readiness ratings. Most group and brigade headquarters arrived at training sites to take command of units with which they had not worked.

8. NGB, "Induction and Release"; William Berebitsky, *A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea, 1950-1953* (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books, 1996), 14-25, 268-69; Schnabel, 134-36.

9. Schnabel, 122-25. The Chief of Staff's selections meant that each of the six numbered armies in the ZI provided either a division or an RCT. Two of the four divisions mobilized in 1951-52 came from the AFF list.

10. MG James C. Styron, quoted in "45th to Train at Camp Polk for Duty: Recruits Are Sought," *The Daily Oklahoman*, 2 August 1950.

11. Donnelly, Chapter 2; COL William B. Rose, "Training the National Guard," student thesis, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1954.

12. Donnelly, Chapter 2; Command Report, 1950, Second Army, Box 943 (RG 407, NA).

13. Memorandum from NGB Information Office for GEN Robert John Fleming Jr., 27 November 1950, "Report on Divisions and RCT's Inducted into Federal Service," File 325.452 General, National Guard Bureau Decimal File 1949-1950, Box 1083 (RG 168, NA); Unit Command Reports for 1950 (RG 407, NA).

14. Donnelly, Chapters 2 and 7.

15. Unit Command Reports, 1950 and 1951 (RG 407, NA); Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, "Master Training Program for National Guard Divisions," 15 October 1950, NGB Decimal File 1949-1950, File 353 General, Box 1107 (RG 168, NA).

16. Command Report, 1950, 28th Infantry Division (RG 407, NA); Command Report, 1950, 45th Infantry Division (RG 407, NA); Command Reports, 1950, 703d, 705th, 713th and 715th AAA Gun Battalions (RG 407, NA).

17. Ibid.

18. COL James J. Winn to Chief, AFF, "Report of Visit to Artillery Units, Fort Hood, Texas, Camp Carson, Colorado, and Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, memorandum, 17 January 1951, Box 41, Inspection Reports (RG 337, NA); Command Reports, 1950 and 1951, 245th Tank Battalion (RG 407, NA); Command Reports, 1951, 703d, 705th, 713th and 736th AAA Gun Battalions (RG 407, NA).

19. Donnelly, Chapter 6.

20. Daniel B. Strickler, *Memoirs of Lieutenant General Daniel Bursk Strickler* (Lancaster, PA: Forry and Hacker, 1972), 168; Donnelly, Chapters 3 through 6.

21. GEN Mark W. Clark to LTGs Edward R. Brooks and Stephen J. Chamberlain, Letters, 23 August and 5 September 1951, Box 34, Inspection Reports (RG 337, NA); GEN Mark W. Clark for GEN J. Lawton Collins, Subject: "Suitability of Major General Kenneth F. Cramer for Continuation in Command of the 43d Infantry Division," Memorandum, 1 October 1951, AFF Decimal File 1951-1952, Box 38 (RG 337, NA).

22. LTG John R. Hodge to GEN Mark W. Clark, Letter, 27 August 1951, Box 34, Inspection Reports (RG 337, NA); "Army Games Show Many Deficiencies," *The New York Times*, 29 August 1951.

23. The Adjutant General's Office, "Directory and Station List of the United States Army, 4 September 1951," copy in US Army Military History Institute; NGB, "Induction and Release."

24. Donnelly, Chapter 3.

25. Donnelly, Chapter 4; Berebitsky, 135-75, 211-33.

26. Donnelly, Chapter 5.

27. Donnelly, Chapters 3 through 5.

28. Kendall; monthly report "Readiness Dates of Major Units in the U.S.," File G3 322, Record Group 319, National Archives, College Park, Maryland (RG 319, NA); "Army Faces Wide Cuts," *The New York Times*, 17 July 1952; "TAC Units to Give Basic," *Army Times*, 6 September 1952.

29. Donnelly, Chapter 6; Berebitsky, 251-52; Wilfrid O. Boettiger, *An Antiaircraft Artilleryman from 1939 to 1970* (privately printed, 1990), 125.

30. Donnelly, Chapter 7. The quote is from "45th Will Keep Training, Grant Short Furlough," *The Daily Oklahoman*, 25 February 1951.

Organic Tactical Air Transport, 1952-1965

by Edgar F. Raines Jr.

In 1951 Lieutenant Leonard Kimmick Jr., of the 21st Infantry Regiment, had a dream. As the men of his regiment climbed the steep Korean hills, burdened with weapons, ammunition, grenades, rations, bedrolls, ponchos and shelter halfs, he envisioned a better future—a future with whirling wings. Assign helicopters, he proposed, as an organic part of infantry battalions under the control of the battalion motor officer. A helicopter could haul the men's extra equipment to a captured objective, resupply ammunition and quickly transport wounded back to the battalion aid station.[1]

Even in 1951, Kimmick's dream was not fantasy. US Army ground forces had been using organic fixed-wing aircraft for some time. The field artillery had obtained its own aircraft, labeled air observation posts, in June 1942. Each firing battalion of field artillery, division artillery and artillery group headquarters received two L-4s, militarized versions of the popular Piper Cub. Eventually, artillery sections at corps, field army, army group and theater also received aircraft.

Aircraft also proved valuable in route reconnaissance, column control, commander and staff transport, courier work, aerial survey, aerial photography, radio relay, emergency wire laying, emergency medical evacuation and emergency resupply.[2] These successes led the War Department to expand the program beyond the field artillery with the begrudging acquiescence of the Army Air Forces.

By 1951 seven branches of the Army had aircraft, but a lack of suitable landing areas in Korea, the number of aircraft in a division and their increasing performance led many division commanders to establish provisional aircraft companies. In January 1953, Eighth Army developed experimental tables of organization and equipment (TOE) for divisional aviation companies, which functioned as administrative rather than tactical units. They contained 26 aircraft.[3]

The introduction of helicopters added greater flexibility, complexity and controversy to a subject that often struck sparks between the Army and the Air Force.[4] As early as December 1943, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces (HQAGF), expressed an interest in replacing L-4s with light observation helicopters. Then, in early 1945, the Army Ground Forces Equipment Board called for an extensive program of light, medium and transport helicopters as well as observation and armed helicopters. Although the War Department set aside these recommendations, in 1946 the Army began testing the Bell YH-13 helicopter as a potential replacement for fixed-wing, light observation aircraft. Added funds generated by the Berlin crisis allowed the Army to buy a limited number of production units in 1948. They began reaching units in

the continental United States in 1949.[5]

That same year, the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, the successor to HQAGF, generated requirements for light-, medium- and heavy-lift helicopters. The Army Staff approved the creation of five experimental transport helicopter companies in May 1950. However, intense opposition from the Air Staff delayed procurement of these helicopters until 1951.

There were no Army helicopters in the Far East when the Korean War broke out, but US Air Force and Marine Corps helicopter units soon arrived in theater. On a time-available basis, they evacuated wounded soldiers and Marines from the front lines. The first Army helicopters to deploy were part of a Medical Service Corps aviation detachment assigned to support a mobile army surgical hospital.[6]

The increasing number of helicopters assigned to Eighth Army made it possible for the field army, corps and even division headquarters to receive one or more observation helicopters. Commanders and their chiefs of staff used the helicopters to visit subordinate headquarters, survey the front lines and better understand the terrain immediately in front of their units. In 1952, the Department of the Army (DA) assigned 10 observation helicopters to each division, making helicopters more available for the liaison and reconnaissance missions they were already flying. While observation helicopters could provide emergency resupply for front-line units, their cargo capacity was necessarily restricted.[7] The Sikorsky H-19 Chickasaw, a utility helicopter, with a payload roughly comparable to the fixed-wing Beaver, first reached units in the continental United States in 1952.[8]

From the beginning, the Army planned to organize aircraft into fairly homogeneous Transportation Corps aviation companies consisting of two observation and 21 transport helicopters. Eventually, they would be grouped into battalions and assigned to field army headquarters for attachment to subordinate units during operations. DA programmed 12 battalions, each consisting of three companies, for activation over the next five years.[9]

Because the small helicopter industry used essentially handcraft production methods, the Army had to spread its orders over a number of companies and purchase a variety of different models to attain its goal. Within two years the Army acquired a second utility helicopter, the Piasecki H-25 Army Mule; two light cargo helicopters, the Piasecki H-21 Shawnee—irreverently referred to as the "Flying Banana"—and the Sikorsky H-34 Choctaw; and a medium cargo helicopter, the Sikorsky H-37 Mojave. However, some time passed before they reached troop units in any number.[10]

The helicopter's chief advantages for the Army were its vertical takeoff and landing capability, short range and relatively slow speeds. Helicopters could operate from normal Army depot and troop areas and be controlled directly by the user. Chief of transportation Major General Frank A. Heileman, who was responsible for maintenance and procurement of Army helicopters, recognized their tactical uses, but he focused on their logistics impact. This emphasis reflected both his administrative responsibilities and the Army's limited experience with helicopters.[11]

In the years immediately after World War II, the Marine Corps had pioneered the tactical employment of helicopters. Marine Commandant General Alexander A. Vandegrift formed a provisional helicopter squadron at Quantico, Virginia, to test the idea of substituting helicopters for amphibious landing craft. Thus, when the Marine Corps entered the Korean War, it possessed the outlines of a tactical doctrine and considerable practical experience in mass helicopter flights.[12] The Army had monitored the Quantico experiments, but it did not gain experience in using helicopters en masse until 1952 when it formed the 6th and 13th Transportation Companies (Helicopter), equipped with H-19s.

Marine Corps helicopters mounted the first helicopter-borne movement of troops in combat in Operation *Summit* on 21 September 1951 moving 224 Marines from their marshalling area to the objective within eight minutes. Although the Army's logistic use of helicopters had matured by war's end, its tactical experience with them, apart from aeromedical evacuation, remained slight.[13]

The Korean experience heavily influenced helicopter operations in the immediate postwar years. Ambushes behind the lines, a restricted road net and broken terrain combined to encourage the Army to increasingly rely on both fixed- and rotary-wing air transport in the combat zone, which normally was defined as from 50 to 100 miles in depth. Here Army aviation had focused and would continue to focus its operations.[14]

Others during this period sought to integrate helicopters into patrol work. One author proposed making a transport helicopter organic to the infantry regiment's intelligence and reconnaissance platoon. The US Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, studied the use of helicopters in raids, although it was not yet prepared to endorse the concept.[15]

By early 1956, instructors at the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, had developed tentative doctrine for an infantry division to command and control offensive helicopter operations. Because transport helicopters were grouped in battalions under the direct control of field army headquarters, the division G3 contemplating a raid would have to request helicopters for the raiding party from higher headquarters. Then, the G3 would have to arrange through joint channels for fighter cover in case the raiders ran into trouble. Because the helicopters were not armed, raiders could not conduct an assault landing into a prepared position; they would have to land unopposed as close as possible, then move over land.[16] In addition, without organic firepower aboard helicopters, raids would have to be conducted within division artillery range to provide preparatory fires and defensive fires if necessary. Thus, the raids would have to be shallow and entirely tactical in scope.

One way out of this dilemma would be to use helicopters as weapon carriers. The US Army Field

Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, began experimenting with transporting 105-millimeter howitzers by helicopter. The school quickly discovered that a 105-millimeter howitzer could be disassembled into three sling loads and transported by an H-19. However, it took nine H-19s to move one gun, one gun crew and sufficient ammunition. With practice, disassembly and re-assembly of the gun took 20 minutes on each end of the trip. Although cumbersome, this technique made it possible for a patrol to operate beyond the divisional artillery zone and still enjoy organic fire support.[17]

This early attempt at integrating helicopters with minor infantry operations suffered from organizational, doctrinal and equipment deficiencies. Successful raids and patrols depend on being able to respond rapidly to an ever-changing situation. The bureaucratic coordination required to bring raiders, helicopters and fighter aircraft together suggested that the response in combat would be anything but timely. Subsequent experience would show the need for suppressive fire on the landing zone between the lifting of artillery fires or close air support and the troops actually landing. Finally, the equipment was hardly ideal. The first generation of transport helicopters was barely satisfactory. Lift capacity was limited. Moreover, they were vulnerable to ground fire and lacked self-sealing tanks and armor. Also, high levels of field maintenance support were required.

As the CGSC faculty refined employment concepts, a technical breakthrough occurred in 1951 as the Navy flight-tested a gas-turbine-powered helicopter. Subsequently, the Army Staff contracted with Bell Helicopter to develop a turbine-powered craft that eventually became the UH-1, familiarly known as the Huey. Bell flight-tested the first copy in November 1956, and the Army received the first production models in late 1959.[18]

The organizational problem was resolved in 1953 when CGSC instructor Lieutenant Colonel John M. Kinzer proposed that an infantry division could make an air assault using helicopters alone. The key, he argued, was developing an eight-ton, heavy-lift helicopter, the size required to move a 155-millimeter howitzer. The gas-turbine engine made his vision possible.[19]

Major General James M. Gavin, former chief of the Army's Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, using studies developed during the Korean War, argued that the Army needed to employ a helicopter force in a cavalry role. Troops mounted in helicopters would possess the necessary speed and agility to perform reconnaissance and screening missions. Gavin asserted that firepower and tactical mobility had competed throughout history with first one then the other in ascendance. The atomic bomb had given firepower a tremendous advantage over mobility. The helicopter would redress the balance for the Army. These themes—the need for an air cavalry force and the importance of mobility—permeated the Army's rationale for employing fixed- and rotary-wing units for the next 10 years.[20]

Gavin's invocation of the atomic bomb reflected the doctrinal ferment going on in the Army. Even as the Korean War raged, Army exercises in the United States postulated the impact of atomic weapons on organization, equipment and tactics. The next war would be an area war, not a linear one. Even if the enemy chose not to use atomic warheads, the threat of their use would keep defenders dispersed. Logistics installations would also have to remain small and scattered to avoid attracting an atomic attack.[21]

This model of future war had vast implications for Army aviation in general and organic tactical air transport in particular. With friendly units scattered, early detection of enemy forces in the division area became a priority and made some kind of sky cavalry absolutely essential. Helicopter-borne infantry would conduct ground reconnaissance, set up blocking positions and harass enemy columns. Division commanders also needed a quick reaction force to fix an enemy column until mechanized and motorized reserves could converge to destroy it. Helicopter-mounted infantry could meet both needs. The dispersion of depots meant a field army commander needed more light and medium fixed-wing transports with greater cargo capacity and with slightly improved range. The new aircraft needed the same unimproved, short-field landing and takeoff characteristics as the Beaver.[22]

The sky cavalry concept caused controversy with the Air Force and within the Army itself when the first provisional unit deployed during Exercise SAGE BRUSH in 1955. Its employment violated the Pace-Finletter agreement that defined the battle zone. The Armor community wanted helicopters attached to mechanized cavalry regiments to ferry the infantry troops needed for ground reconnaissance. The intelligence community wanted aircraft equipped with radar and infrared detectors to passively collect intelligence. The US Army Aviation School at Fort Rucker, Alabama, advocated a mix of armed helicopters, troop carriers and electronic collection aircraft. This use eventually won out in the early 1960s.[23]

In contrast to the disputes about the tactical employment of helicopters, the development of fixed-wing transports proceeded without controversy. In 1953, the Army tested the efficiency of fixed- versus rotary-wing cargo aircraft and discovered the former was more efficient for any flight of more than 40 miles. De-Haviland of Canada remained the Army's manufacturer of choice for cargo airplanes. Its single-engine U-1 Otter could carry nine combat-loaded soldiers or 3,000 pounds of cargo. In 1959, the first CV-2 Caribou entered the inventory. The Caribou, with a capacity for three tons of cargo or 32 combat-loaded soldiers, possessed excellent short-field takeoff and landing characteristics and could operate in extremely primitive conditions. When the first Caribou deployed to Vietnam in 1961 for field testing, Army aviators discovered the aircraft could operate out of all 130 military airstrips in country. Air Force C-47s and C-119s could use only 30.[24]

In response to the expanded role envisioned for airplanes and helicopters on the atomic battlefield, both CGSC and the US Army Infantry School had reorganized their airborne departments to give the employment of Army aviation equal

weight in the curriculum with airborne assaults. Each also assumed responsibility for preparing doctrinal publications. The Airborne-Army Aviation Department at the Infantry School is credited with having pioneered the term "air mobility" to refer to helicopter-transported infantry assaults. The Department of Airborne Operations and Army Aviation at CGSC introduced the phrase "airmobile operations."[25]

In 1960, DA organized the Army Aircraft Requirements Review Board, commonly known as the Rogers Board after chairman Lieutenant General Gordon B. Rogers, the deputy commander of Continental Army Command (CONARC). Charged with projecting the Army's aviation-equipment requirements for the next 10 years, the board concluded that the Army should continue to exploit low-speed, low-level flight and procure only aircraft that could use austere forward airstrips.[26]

Of more immediate concern was the Army's decision to abolish the Pentomic division. Chief of Staff General George H. Decker came to office in 1960 convinced that the pentomic division was unsuited for a conventional war. Among its shortcomings, the division lacked mobility. The Army reorganized around the Reorganization Objectives Army Division (ROAD) consisting of three brigades, each with three infantry battalions, and containing roughly twice the number of aircraft as the Pentomic division. Aircraft were organized into an aviation battalion (its airmobile company could move one infantry company in a single lift), an air cavalry troop as part of the divisional reconnaissance battalion and direct support aviation sections in artillery and brigade headquarters. The air cavalry troop was the Army Aviation School's old sky cavalry troop under another name.[27]

The new division was simply the most visible manifestation of a shift in emphasis as Army leaders saw they needed the ability to deter or quickly fight and win "brushfire" wars that if unchecked could spread into a general nuclear war. Increasing the Army's tactical proficiency and mobility became the primary justification for Army tactical airlift.[28]

ROAD was the first of a series of organizational innovations to affect Army aviation during the 1960s. During the late 1950s, the Artillery School had continued to experiment with moving 105-millimeter howitzers by air, but now artillerymen could move an entire battery plus fire-control equipment. However, they still had to break individual howitzers into two sling loads. In 1959, the Army began procuring the Vertol CH-47 "Chinook." Powered by two gas-turbine engines, Chinooks could lift an entire 105-millimeter howitzer in a single load. The Army received the first test aircraft in 1961. Its advent removed the most serious technological constraint to forming an airmobile division.[29]

In the late 1950s, Colonel Jay D. Vanderpool, the officer responsible for developing the armed helicopter, prepared plans for a helicopter mounted division, which he briefed to the then director of Army aviation, Major General Hamilton H. Howze. Nothing resulted from his proposal. However, Howze was later a member of the Rogers Board and tried, without success, to persuade the board to examine alternative concepts of organization and employment of Army aviation in addition to equipment needs. He did succeed in attaching a short appendix on "The Requirement for Air Fighting Units."[30]

In 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara directed DA to establish a board to study innovative methods of employing the helicopter. He designated Howze as its head. Working through the summer of 1962, the Howze Board, technically the Tactical Requirements Mobility Board, recommended that the Army immediately field three standard "type" aviation units: an air assault division equipped with enough organic helicopters to move one infantry brigade and supporting elements in a single lift, an air transport brigade capable of sustaining an airmobile division exclusively through an air line-of-communications, and an air cavalry brigade in which every member of the organization was helicopter mounted and all equipment was helicopter transportable.[31]

Faced with these radical proposals, the Department of Defense (DOD) directed DA to further test the air assault division and air transport brigade concepts. The Army activated the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) and the 10th Air Transport Brigade, equipped with Caribous and Chinooks, at Fort Benning in February 1963. At the same time, the Air Force convinced DOD to establish a parallel test of a ROAD division backed by the full panoply of modern tactical air support. The Air Force was convinced that such a force would be equally effective but less costly.[32]

Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson viewed the two tests on successive weeks. Comparing one division to the other, he commented, was like comparing "a gazelle and an elephant," but he added, the Army needed both. However, DA opted to activate the air assault division but not the air transport brigade. The division deployed to Vietnam as the lst Cavalry Division (Airmobile) less than 90 days after its activation. The following year, the Caribou and the follow-on DeHaviland CV-7 Buffalo were transferred to the Air Force.[33]

Late in World War II, some Army officers had recognized the helicopter's potential for tactically moving troops. Korea, with its rugged terrain and poor road network, reinforced this perception. Between the Korean and Vietnam Wars Army

Edgar F. Raines Jr., is a historian with the US Army Center of Military History, Fort Leavenworth. He received a B.A. and an M.A. from Southern Illinois University and a Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin. He is the co-author, with Major David R. Campbell, of The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on Command, Control and Coordination of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1942-1989*, and the author of the forthcoming* Eyes of Artillery: The Origins of Modern U.S. Army Aviation during World War II*, as well as several articles. In 1994-1995, he spent a year as a member of the Roles and Missions directorate (ODCSOPS).*

officers had discussed airmobile operations in almost purely tactical terms. Almost continuous friction with the Air Force contributed to this focus. Only a few public hints suggested that some Army officers might be thinking in terms of grand tactics, what is now called the operational level of war. The use of an air transport brigade to support a field army, as recommended by the Howze Board, certainly suggested a depth of operations greater than the tactical; however, the overwhelming bulk of the published writing was tactical.[34]

The intellectual deficiencies of the Army's work with airmobile forces; that is, the failure to consider their implications for the conduct of war on the operational level, anticipated the difficulty the Army would have between 1965 and 1973 in converting tactical successes into operational and strategic victories or even articulating the linkages between the three levels. In a sense, the Army's work with airmobility in the 1950s and early 1960s served as prologue for Colonel Harry Summers' observation about Vietnam—that the Army had won all the battles and lost the war.[35]

Since at least the 1880s the professional essence of the US Army has been tied up with the concept of combined arms—the idea that only by bringing to bear all the available weapons and the capacities of its various branches can a force prevail on the modern battlefield. In this mental construct, an airplane or a helicopter became just another piece of equipment, like a truck or an armored personnel carrier (APC), to be integrated into existing units to increase their capabilities.

The evolving nature of war and the technical capacities of the aircraft determined how they were organized and employed by the Army in the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, since at least the latter stages of the American Civil War, the Army had confronted the fact that infantry could no longer carry prepared positions by frontal assault without incurring unacceptable losses. Over the next century, the Army explored alternatives—fire and movement squad tactics, rapid-fire artillery, the tank, the APC and airborne assault tactics. The helicopter promised to allow the infantry to literally rise above this dilemma. At the same time, to the foot-slogging infantry in the field, the helicopter was a wonderful, labor-saving device, which allowed them to reach their objective with less physical exertion and to husband their energy for the assault. Afterward, the helicopter permitted ample and timely resupply so infantrymen who seized a position were much more likely to hold it against counterattacks. The Army consequently acquired an airmobile capability much more quickly than the state of its budget might have suggested was feasible.

Incomplete as it was, Army thinking about the employment of light infantry forces underwent a revolution in the 1950s. The era's often-temperamental helicopters, with their reciprocating engines and limited lift capacity, may have soaked up maintenance, but their performance just as surely showcased the potential of "the rotary-wing revolution." That potential involved restoring the infantry's battlefield agility worn away by increased firepower and mechanization, products of the industrial revolution.

In seeking to rapidly concentrate widely dispersed forces, Gavin advocated precisely coordinated and timed movements only recently possible. The modern concept of simultaneity—attacking enemy front-line and reserve forces in depth throughout the theater—is in many ways the reverse image of what he was attempting to attain, and it requires a communications capability the reformers of the 1950s lacked. By proposing that air cavalry continuously monitor and occasionally harass advancing enemy columns, reformers sought to provide commanders with sufficient reliable information to maneuver around the dangers of the atomic battlefield. However, the world was still one of analog communications, paper maps, acetate overlays and grease pencils and small-unit commanders forced to determine their own positions by dead reckoning. "Enhanced situational awareness" was still a computer revolution away. Given these genuine limitations, it is certainly questionable how well the Army, even if built to Gavin's specifications, could have coped with a real atomic battlefield.

However, the attempt to cope with that danger pushed Army doctrine and equipment in fruitful directions for waging conventional war. Similarly, logisticians such as Heileman discerned the need for a dispersed, flexible and responsive supply system and saw Army aviation as a key component in its creation. Here, too, lay the germinal of some revolutionary ideas.

The legacy of the 1950s to the reformers of the 1990s lies not in the solutions proposed but in the open-mindedness and energy with which those earlier leaders addressed the problems of modern combat in a very different technological environment. ***MR***

NOTES

This essay is a slightly revised version of a paper the author presented at the 1997 Air Mobility Symposium sponsored by the Air Force History Foundation, the Air Force History and Museums Program and the Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. They graciously permitted its publication in this forum.

1. LT Leonard Kimmick Jr., "Battalion Helicopter," *Combat Forces Journal,* 2 (January 1952), 33.

2. See Kent Roberts Greenfield, *Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team Including Organic Light Aviation*, Army Ground Forces (AGF) Historical Study 35 (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Division, 1948); COL Andrew Ten Eyck, *Jeeps in the Sky: The Story of the Light Plane* (New York: Commonwealth Books, 1946); Richard Tierney and Fred Montgomery, *The Army Aviation Story* (Northport, AL: Colonial Press, 1963); Ken Wakefield, *The Fighting Grasshoppers: US Liaison Aircraft Operations in Europe, 1942-45* (Stillwater, MN: Specialty Press, 1990); Edgar F. Raines, *Eyes of Artillery: The Origins of Modern Army Aviation During World War II* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History (CMH), pending).

3. Department of the Army (DA), Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) 7N, 7 July 1948, Infantry Division, and TOE 7, DA, 15 May 1952, Infantry Division, both in Organizational History Branch Files, CMH, Washington, DC.

4. LTC Jack L. Marinelli, "Army Aviation Surveys the Battlefield," *Army Information Digest*, 5 (April 1950), 47-52.

5. MG G.R. Cook et al., Board of Officers Convened to Study the Equipment of the Post War Army, 20 June 1945, HQ, AGF, General Correspondence, 1942-1948, Annex I, Air Support Equipment, 334/2 (Equipment Review Board) (S), RG 337, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC; Weinert, 12; Tierney and Montgomery, 93-96.

6. Peter Dorland and James Nanney, *Dust Off: Army Aeromedical Evacuation in Vietnam* (Washington, DC: CMH, 1982), 17-20; Albert E. Cowdrey, *The Medic's War*, US Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: CMH, 1987), 163-67.

7. MAJ Robert Winkler, "Height of Battle," *Infantry School Quarterly*, 45 (January 1945), 100; see also "Army Has Plans for Combat 'Copter Battalions," *Army Navy Air Force (ANAF) Journal*, 89 (30 August 1952), 1604; TOE 7, DA, 15 May 1952, Infantry Division.

8. "Copters in Eustis Problem," *ANAF Journal*, 90 (1 November 1952): 252; Weinert, 15-24.

9. BG Paul F. Yount, Acting Chief of Transportation, "Air Transportation and the Army," *National Defense Transportation Journal*, 9 (September-October 1953), 64.

10. COL Robert B. Neely, Assistant Chief of Transportation (Army Aviation), "Army Aviation," *ANAF Journal*, 92 (6 November 1992), 273, 302.

11. See "The All-Service Helicopter," *Army Information Digest*, 4 (June 1949), 13-18.

12. LTC Eugene W. Rawlins, *Marines and Helicopters, 1946-1962* (Washington, DC: History and Muse-

ums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1976), 14-18.

13. Winkler, 99; MAJ Nelson A. Mahone Jr., "A Tactical Role for Helicopters," *Army Information Digest*, 10 (September 1955), 33-38; MAJ Archie J. Clapp, "Their Mission is Mobility," *Military Review*, 33 (August 1953), 10-18; Lynn Montross, *Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of US Marine Combat Helicopters* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), 162-65.

14. Frank Pace Jr., Secretary of the Army; Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force; GEN J. Lawton Collins, CSA; GEN Nathan F. Twining, VCSAF, 4 November 1952, Memorandum of Understanding Relating to Army Organic Aviation, in Richard I. Wolf, ed., *The United States Air Force Basic Documents on Roles and Missions*, Air Staff Historical Study (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1988), 243-245.

15. MAJ George H. Reid, "Helicopter Patrol," *Army Combat Forces Journal*, 5 (September 1954), 40-41; CPT Bickford E. Sawyer Jr., "Raid from the Sky!" *Infantry School Quarterly*, 43 (October 1953), 34-41.

16. LTC Stuart M. Seaton, "The Helicopter in Early Link-Up Operations," *Military Review*, 35 (January 1956), 33-42.

17. "Artillery School Develops Method for 'Air Mailing' 105-mm Howitzers," *ANAF Journal*, 91 (27 March 1954), 892.

18. "Turbine Powered Copter," *ANAF Journal*, 89 (22 December 1951), 495; "Turbo 'Copter Completes Flight," *ANAF Journal*, 92 (25 December 1954), 506; "Army's Turbine-Powered Bell XH-40 Helicopter," *ANAF Journal*, 94 (10 November 1956), 3.

19. LTC John M. Kinzer, "Airborne Assault by an Infantry Division," *Military Review*, 33 (October 1953), 45-53.

20. MG James M. Gavin, "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses," *Harper's Magazine*, 208 (April 1954), 54-60.

21. GEN Matthew B. Ridgway, Testimony before Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations, 7-8 February 1955, 23; John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry, Part I: "Regular Army," *Army Lineage Series* (Washington, DC: CMH, 1972), 88-93.

22. DA Field Manual (FM) 20-100, Army Aviation, February 1952 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1952), 1; COL William B. Bunker, Transportation Corps, "Why the Army Needs Wings," *Army*, 6 (March 1956), 19-23. Change 2, 27 July 1956, DA FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations*, 27 September 1954 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1956), 7-8, provided the first detailed enumeration of tactical helicopter missions in the Army's core doctrine publication.

23. "Army Looks to Sage Brush's SkyCav Operation as Basis of Permanent Unit", *ANAF Journal*, 93 (10 December 1955), 1, 3.

24. LTC Frank G. Forrest, "Helicopters or Fixed Wing?" *Army Combat Forces Journal*, 5 (June 1955), 46-47; LTG Dwight E. Beach, "Caribou in Southeast Asia," *Army*, 13 (December 1962), 36-39.

25. DA, FM 57-35, *Army Transport Aviation Combat Operations*, Draft. Later published as FM 57-35, *Airmobile Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960).

26. Army Aircraft Requirements Review Board, Paper, 29 February 1960, *Army Aviation Development Plan*, Historical Research Branch Files, HRC 334 (Board—Aircraft Requirements Review Board), CMH; LTC John W. Oswalt, "Report on the 'Rogers' Board," *US Army Aviation Digest*, 7 (February 1961), 15-17; LTG John J. Tolson, "Airmobility, 1961-1971," *Vietnam Studies* (Washington, DC: DA, 1973), 8-10.

27. TOE 7E, DA, 15 July 1963, Infantry Division, Organizational History Branch Files, CMH; LTC Morris G. Rawlings, "Army Aviation and the Reorganized Army Division," *US Army Aviation Digest*, 8 (February 1962), 1-4.

28. COL Raymond L. Shoemaker Jr., LTC John K. Singlab and MAJ John H. Cushman, "Readiness for the Little War: Optimum Integrated Strategy," *Military Review*, 37 (April 1957), 14-26; GEN Clyde D. Eddleman, Vice CSA, "Mobility and Future Land Warfare," *Army Information Digest*, 17 (May 1962), 26-31.

29. "From Horseflesh to Whirlybirds: The 4th Field (Mule Pack) Becomes 4th Field (Helicopter Pack)," *Army*, 8 (July 1958), 70-71; MAJ John C. Geary, "The Chinook, Advanced Battlefield Mobility Vehicle," *US Army Aviation Digest*, 8 (August 1962), 3-8.

30. GEN Hamilton H. Howze, *A Cavalryman's Story: Memoirs of a Twentieth-Century Army General* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996), 235-36.

31. Howze, President, Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board Report, 20 August 1962, Brief by the President of the Board in Organizational History Branch Files, CMH; "Irwin School's Summer Term," *Army*, 13 (September 1962), 74, 76, 78; Howze, "The Howze Board," *Army*, 24 (February 1974), 8-14; (March 1974), 18-24; (April 1974), 18-24; Howze, *A Cavalryman's Story*, 233-57.

32. See Robert F. Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1984*, vol 2 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1989), 178-92.

33. MG Edward L. Rowny, "After the Air Mobile Test," *Army*, 15 (May 1965), 36-41.

34. COL Robert B. Rigg, "Kinesthetic Warfare: Mode for the Future," *Military Review*, 45 (September 1965), 13-19.

35. COL Harry G. Summers Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983), 1.

MR Review Essay

The Vietnam War—The Other Side

by Colonel Griffin N. Dodge, US Army, Retired

Most of the literature published in the United States about the Vietnam War examines the American experience. Tai Sung An, author of *The Vietnam War* (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, Cranbury, New Jersey, 1998, 347 pages), takes an alternative approach: "The central focus of this book is on the various aspects of the Vietnamese Communists' political, military, diplomatic and other behaviors during the Vietnam War [also known as the Second Indochina War]."

An briefly sketches Vietnam's 3,000-year history, then quickly brings Vietnam into the 20th century. He includes biographical information on Ho Chi Minh, the dominant Vietnamese personality of the Vietnam War era. An characterizes Ho Chi Minh as an ardent Vietnamese nationalist completely dedicated to communist ideology who possessed political cunning and, above all, cold-blooded ruthlessness. An contrasts this characterization with the contrived public image of the kindly, "venerable Uncle Ho."

Throughout the book, An cites publications on the US experience in Vietnam as well as other recently translated North Vietnamese documents and publications. He also scrutinizes a variety of other sources such as captured documents and radio broadcasts. From his extensive research, he creates an intriguing portrayal of North Vietnamese leaders during the "Second Indochina War." An notes that of those involved in the Vietnamese Communist Party during the early 1930s, many survived to witness the 1975 victory of their revolutionary struggle. It was their "steely determination," intense nationalism and clever political maneuvering that sustained the leaders even after Ho Chi Minh's death in 1969. However, An suggests that in light of the terrible losses and destruction and the subsequent social and economic failures North Vietnam suffered, it was a Pyrrhic victory.

The leaders, with the unwavering objective of expanding North Vietnamese communist control over South Vietnam and, incidentally, Laos and Cambodia, maintained a totalitarian communist state in North Vietnam while conducting direct and indirect warfare. An describes the internal conflicts and intense external pressures the leaders experienced. The reader cannot help but be impressed by the remarkable tenacity of those leaders and the profound discipline they demanded of themselves and of the North Vietnamese people.

An's descriptions of the political skills demonstrated by various leaders in their interactions with foreign governments are fascinating. Their ability to work their patrons, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, against each other to North Vietnam's benefit is little short of amazing. Also remarkable are the descriptions of their ability to recognize the constraints placed by the United States on its own operations. The North Vietnamese exploited those constraints in conjunction with their strategy of "fighting while talking." Thus they forged ahead in the drive toward their ultimate goal of dominance over all of Indochina. Their remarkable dedication and political skills were apparently either unknown to or ignored by US leaders, who attempted to interact with

North Vietnamese leaders as if they were rational and reasonable Americans.

An's portrayals of South Vietnam's leaders are in clear contrast to their northern counterparts. He stereotypes southern leaders as corrupt, isolated from the population at large and lacking strategic goals. An's comments about province chiefs—senior military officers appointed to administer the provinces—are particularly harsh. His portrayals are consistent with the "conventional wisdom" of the period and likely describe some individuals. However, the two province chiefs with whom I personally associated from 1972 and into 1973 did not fit An's stereotype. They constantly interacted with the population and were dedicated to improving local economic circumstances, enriching local lifestyles and encouraging an environment in which local leaders could be selected in free elections.

On occasion, An wields his "field marshal's baton" and critiques US tactical operations. His comments usually rehash earlier writings on the same issues. He often cites "pacification" as attempts by South Vietnamese leaders to "win the hearts and minds" of the people. But, he fails to mention the Civil Operations and Revolutionary—sometimes "Rural"—Development Support (CORDS) program.

CORDS paralleled and supported South Vietnam's pacification programs from mid-1967 to early 1973. While not unusually successful in winning hearts and minds, CORDS and indigenous pacification efforts resulted in positive accomplishments. Those pacification efforts were even effective in enticing large segments of the population away from Vietcong influence.

The *Vietnam War* is not for the casual reader, nor is it for the reader unfamiliar with the complexities of the Vietnam War. Its narrow focus knowingly disregards some aspects of US involvement. The more than 1,200 endnotes, many citing multiple sources, can be a distraction. In contrast, the index is brief and inadequate. However, for the student of the Vietnam War and for military professionals, the book provides a unique and valuable perspective. Its interesting conclusions and "lessons" make it well worth reading. ***MR***

Colonel Griffin N. Dodge, US Army, Retired, received a B.A. from Colorado State University and an M.A. from the University of New Mexico. He is a graduate of the US Army War College. He served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States, Vietnam and Germany. He is a frequent contributor of book reviews for MR.

MR Book Reviews

NEVER AT WAR: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another by Spencer R. Weart. 432 pages. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. 1998. $35.00.

The United States and its allies recently witnessed the late Soviet Union's democratization. We believed the transformation of our enemy's domestic political institutions would transform its foreign and military policies, making it far less a threat to world peace. Why did we believe this, and were we right?

Are democratic nations really less likely to resort to war than autocracies or dictatorships—be they hereditary, communist, fascist or fundamentalist? Spencer R. Weart's book *Never at War* contains one of the most definitive discussions of this issue. After a panoramic investigation of world history from antiquity to the present, Weart concludes that, yes, democracies are inherently peaceful. In the last paragraph he says that the most effective way to "attain universal peace [is] to achieve universal democracy."

Weart's exhaustive research confirms America's seat-of-the-pants intuition. Exactly why democracy promotes peace is another issue—one that does not attest to the inherent wisdom of our preconceptions. Traditionally, Americans distrust government and officialdom. We tend to believe democracies are more pacific than dictatorships because they give more power to "the people," who have vested interest in peace, and less power to the government, which has a vested interest in expanding its own powers through edicts and expenditures. Because war enhances state power, it is naturally attractive to government. According to this logic, if democracy is peaceful, it is largely because the people govern and not the office-holding class.



Weart rejects arguments that emphasize constitution limitations on government power. He focuses on political culture—what he calls "the central tendency of political leaders to deal with [their] foreign counterparts as they deal with one another at home."

Officials in democracies rise to high office by compromise, bargaining and consensus; officials in dictatorships get power by threat, fear and terror. The former are likely to seek compromise in international disputes; the latter will likely pursue domination.

Contrary to populist prejudices, government might actually be too peaceful, at least in a democracy. Weart attributes appeasement of

dictators to democracies' noble but naive presumption that dictators gain power through compromise and will accept reasonable terms in resolving an international problem. Often, those well-intentioned officials only confirm that threats and terrors are as effective in international as in domestic politics.

Weart has a few words of warning, particularly for populists. Some of the most democratic societies in world history have been the most warlike. Those governments, more anarchy than democracy, allowed their citizens so much freedom they could steal and pillage virtually at will. In the process, they provoked war and retribution on a continual basis. This sobering analysis applies today when Eastern European democracy looks like a halfway house between autocracy and anarchy—the next real danger to world peace.

Michael Pearlman,
Combat Studies Institute,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

TOJO: The Last Banzai by Courtney Browne. 260 pages. Da Capo Press, New York. 1998. $14.95.

Tojo: The Last Banzai was originally published in 1967. It is one of only two biographies of Japanese General Tojo written in English. Both are still in print. The other, *Tojo and the Coming of the War* (Stanford University Press, 1961, $65.00), written by Robert J.C. Butow, examines Tojo's life and place in the Imperial Japanese Army's history.

Butow's work is based on a wide range of Japanese and English language sources and is one of the standard historical works in English on the period. In contrast, Browne's study is a much briefer, popularized biography. He interviewed the general's widow, gained her confidence and through this source gives special insight into the man. Both treatments are equally useful.

Tojo: The Last Banzai is eminently fair minded. In fact, some would consider it overly understanding. Browne views Tojo as a conservative Japanese would—as an upright government official determined not to surrender to American economic blackmail over Japanese expansion in East and Southeast Asia, preferring war to surrendering national goals. The portrait Browne presents is interesting and compelling.

I unreservedly recommend this book to those interested in learning more about Tojo, the way the Imperial Japanese Army viewed his life, the Pacific War from a Japanese perspective or the insular and intellectual context of Japanese militarism.

Lewis Bernstein,
Assistant Command Historian,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas



CIVIL WAR PRISONS: A Study in War Psychology by William B. Hesseltine. 290 pages. Ohio State University Press, Columbus, OH. 1998. $29.95.

William B. Hesseltine first published *Civil War Prisons* in 1930. The book grew out of his dissertation research at Ohio State University and has long been the definitive work in its field.

Hesseltine's controversial study examines a festered wound—the belief that the South bore the principal responsibility for wartime atrocities in prison camps. Though figures vary depending on sources, a conservative estimate is that 26,436 of 220,000 Southern prisoners died in captivity compared to 22,576 Northerners who perished in Southern camps.

What made the original edition of the book particularly controversial was Hesseltine's dismissal of the charge that the Confederacy conspired to kill Northern prisoners. In his view, Northern propaganda was so effective during and immediately after the war that it became easy to imagine Confederate atrocities. The trial and subsequent execution of Andersonville prison's commandant Major Henry Wirz only fueled radical Republicans' hatred of their former adversaries. The feeling grew as the accounts of atrocities emerged from Andersonville survivors.

If Hesseltine's work has a shortcoming, it is that it sheds no new light on who was responsible for Northern propaganda efforts that so demonized the South. What responsibility did President Abraham Lincoln bear? Hesseltine alleges that Lincoln's decision in 1863 to end the prisoner exchange led the South to continue to hold Northern captives even though they did not have the resources to care for them. Moreover, despite Northern rhetoric concerning the welfare of black soldiers in Confederate prisons, Lincoln and his generals focused more on depriving the South of manpower than on alleviating the plight of prisoners. This indictment is reminiscent of Confederate President Jefferson Davis's assessment that Lincoln's administration preferred legal trivialities and a war of extermination over caring for its own soldiers.

Though Hesseltine presents a far more benevolent view of the Southern perspective, he does not let the Confederacy completely off the hook. He considers Andersonville's horrible conditions the exception rather than the rule but alleges that such conditions were the result of the Davis administration's haphazard response to a sudden explosion of need. However, Hesseltine is harsher on Lincoln's motives than he is on Davis's.

William Blair's foreword is particularly instructive in placing this edition in the proper political perspective. Nothwithstanding Hesseltine's penchant for making controversial statements to elicit an emotional reaction, *Civil War Prisons* has withstood the test of time and remains a valuable contribution to Civil War literature.

COL Cole C. Kingseed,
US Military Academy,
West Point, New York



ROMMEL'S GREATEST VICTORY: The Desert Fox and the Fall of Tobruk, Spring 1942, by Samuel W. Mitcham Jr. 243 pages. Presidio Press, Novato, CA. 1998. $27.95.

Field Marshal Erik Rommel's Afrika Corps' successes in 1941 won him the reputation of battlefield invincibility and the *nom de guerre* "The Desert Fox." His successes were tactical in the grand scheme of things because although he had surprised and defeated the British 8th Army in several fights, he could not dislodge Commonwealth forces and failed to reach the Suez Canal. He could not achieve the strategic aim of conquering Egypt and denying the canal to Axis enemies.

In *Rommel's Greatest Victory*, Samual W. Mitcham Jr. ably describes events leading to the Tobruk garrison's capitulation on the morning of 22 June 1942. The battle, which lasted 29 days, had begun when Rommel's forces reached the fortresses' outer defenses on 10 April 1941. Mitcham's balanced treatment of both combatants describes a closely run battle for each side.

As is frequently the case in mobile warfare, Rommel eventually prevailed because of skill, audacity and luck. In the case of Tobruk, indecisiveness, incompetence and perhaps bad luck precipitated the British loss, which stunned British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the Commonwealth.

Rommel and his forces also erred during the fight. Losses of senior German officers captured, wounded and killed were high as the fighting swirled from one strongpoint to another. Combat strength vacillated wildly, but Herculean effort by tank repair units enabled combatants to continue the fight. In the end, leadership, competence and aggressiveness prevailed.

This is an extremely well written, readable book. Much effort was put into the battle's chronology, which follows success and failure among individual British and German units. Mitcham also includes an interesting epilogue, which details what happened to battle participants during the remainder of the war and after its end.

COL Robert A. Gimbert,
USA, Retired,
Georgetown, Texas

ONE DAY TOO LONG: Top Secret Site 85 and the Bombing of North Vietnam by Timothy N. Castle. 352 pages. Columbia University Press, New York. 1999. $24.95.

Few secrets of US wartime operations in Southeast Asia were more closely guarded than US Air Force Operation *Project Heavy Green*. Operating near the crest of a remote mountain in northeastern Laos, scarcely 12 miles from the Laotia-North Vietnamese border, the top-secret radar bombing facility's sole purpose was to guide Thailand-based strike aircraft against North Vietnam's most sensitive bases.

To the North Vietnamese, the high-tech facility posed a dangerous, intolerable challenge. In November 1967, barely four months after the facility began operating, an elite North Vietnamese commando unit destroyed it in a bloody predawn assault. Seven of the 19 Americans escaped, three were killed. The fate of the remaining nine remains a mystery.

The US government classified all military and CIA operations in Laos, as in North Vietnam, because US presence in the politically neutral country violated the 1962 *Geneva Agreements* that barred all foreign military forces. But there were other reasons for hiding the tragedy at Site 85. As Timothy Castle reveals in this exhaustively researched and responsibly written expose, the event was a scandal that soon led to a self-serving search for scapegoats and reprehensible conduct by senior Air Force officers in Southeast Asia and the US ambassador to Laos. Castle notes: "[Q]uestions, recriminations and cover-up began immediately."

Castle's suspenseful writing style and dogged tenacity penetrate the decades-long US government efforts to hide this shameful event. This authoritative account is also a refreshing departure from the all-too-common practice of describing dubious adventures without documenting sources. A curious exception to this otherwise excellent documentation is the lack of an index, which would prove a useful addition to future editions.

COL Michael E. Haas,
USAF, Retired,
Incline Village, Nevada

LIKE MEN OF WAR: Black Troops in the Civil War, 1862-1865, by Noah Andrew Trudeau. 576 pages. Little Brown and Company, New York, NY. 1998. $18.00.

The British poet Lord George Byron once complained about making heroes of every character with passing notoriety: "Every week and month sends forth a new one," he lamented. The same might be said of books on the American Civil War. With increasing regularity bookstore shelves are filled with "new" analyses of major battles or "undiscovered" diaries, notebooks or battle plans that offer "fresh insight" into the United States' most traumatic conflict. All but the most ardent devotees must be wondering how much more can really be said.

The answer, in part, lies in Noah Trudeau's new book, *Like Men of War*. This detailed and engaging study of African American soldiers' contributions to the Union's war effort will interest even the most jaded Civil War scholar. Using materials long available in the public domain but seldom, if ever, examined with such meticulous care, Trudeau reveals how Blacks from the South, often with inadequate arms and virtually no training in the art of war, fought honorably under the Stars and Stripes. By the end of the war,

nearly 180,000 had enlisted. Northerners often did not appreciate their service, frequently looked on them as a temporary expedient to defeat the Confederacy and had no real use for them as people or respect for their loyalty and bravery under fire. Trudeau further describes the unsavory practices Union generals and politicians used to enlist slaves and freedmen.

Tacticians will thrill to the accounts of hundreds of minor skirmishes in which African American units played a role. Chronicling the hour-by-hour movements of units as small as companies and platoons gives the book a sense of immediacy. Trudeau allows the historical record to speak for itself, editorializing rather sparingly, then only highlighting his conclusions. As a consequence, this book does not preach; it reveals the often untold and under-appreciated story of African American soldiers who fought for their personal freedom and the Constitutional form of government that protected the rights of everyone in America. *Like Men of War* traces how our national ideals can inspire men and women of all colors and ethnic backgrounds.

LTC Laurence W. Mazzeno,
USA, Retired,
Reading, Pennsylvania

MUSSOLINI AND THE BRITISH
by Richard Lamb. 356 pages. John Murray, London. Distributed by Trafalgar Square, North Pomfret, VT. 1998. $45.00.

Mussolini and the British is a valuable case study in diplomacy, foreign policy and strategy. Richard Lamb completely recasts the common interpretation of Anglo-Italian relations' role in the origins of World War II.

England and Italy were not inevitable enemies. Lamb argues that British attitudes toward *Il Duce*—Mussolini—were an unending series of missteps and misunderstandings. Successive British administrations missed several significant opportunities to prevent an alliance between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.

That Mussolini and Adolf Hitler were anything but natural allies is not surprising. Italy was never enthusiastic about the *Anschluss* of Austria to Germany. Mussolini had worked hard to bring Austria under his own sphere of influence. He was even less excited about the thought of German domination in the Balkans or forging an iron-clad military alliance with Hitler.

Lamb's research suggests that divisions between Germany and Italy were not only wide but ripe for exploitation. This remarkable and engaging study in balance of power diplomacy demonstrates that Mussolini tried to steer an independent, even at times anti-Hitler, foreign policy and that the British persistently failed to take advantage of the situation.

Lamb makes no excuses for Mussolini. He argues that the Italian leader was not an "inhuman ogre," yet he has no trouble pointing out Mussolini's brutal, amoral side. Lamb's criticisms of British estrangement from *Il Duce* are therefore curious; Mussolini proved time and again a faithless ally. How could the British ever trust him?

This story is particularly relevant today. Currently, many world powers possess both bright and dark sides. Before Saddam Hussein became the "great Satan," he was a quasi-American ally, a bulwark against the expansion of Iranian revolution. Today Iraq is out; Iran is in. Iranian leaders have signaled they might be ready to reopen engagement with the United States. However, many people are uncomfortable with the Islamic republic's progress in human rights and geo-strategic designs for central Asia.

Similar perplexing issues of whom to trust face the US in other regions. Since US national strategy places a premium on collective security and regional stability, these timeless issues are more important than ever.

Mussolini and the British provides a well-researched, finely written, clearly organized study of the challenges of dealing with nations and leaders you just can't trust. I strongly recommend this book.

LTC James J. Carafano,
USA, Washington, DC



SISTERHOOD OF SPIES: The Women of the OSS by Elizabeth P. MacIntosh. 304 pages. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD. 1998. $29.95.

World War II is "hot" again. However, the popular subject's focus is still mainly on men—the blockbuster movie, *Saving Private Ryan* (Dreamworks Home Entertainment, Universal City, CA, 1999, $24.99); Stephen Ambrose's various histories based on extensive interviews of World War II veterans; and several other best sellers by nationally recognized personalities, such as newsman Tom Brokaw, who highlights the accomplishments of the Depression-era generation in his book *The Greatest Generation* (Random House, New York, 1998, $24.95).

Sisterhood of Spies by Elizabeth P. MacIntosh attempts to rectify the situation, although it focuses predominantly on civilian women within the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), not the smaller military contingent.

It is a is fascinating book. MacIntosh combines historical narrative, case studies and oral histories to trace both the development of the OSS and women's expanding roles within the agency, ending with a description of how that tradition has affected the missions women currently perform in the CIA. Despite its title, the book does not take up women as operatives—spies—detailing German positions or blowing up bridges, although women did indeed function in those roles.

MacIntosh, an OSS operative, served primarily in Asia. She used those experiences in her memoir

Undercover Girl (published in 1947 under the name Elizabeth P. MacDonald). Her association with the OSS and its follow-on, the CIA, is much more extensive.

During World War II, regardless of professional background or expertise, women were shunted into administrative and support functions that allow any bureaucracy to function. The brilliance of the one-legged spy Virginia Hall was all the more impressive when compared to the vast majority of women—such as Julia McWilliams Child, the future chef, who served with the OSS in China—who did research and analysis or who managed the operational support for field agents.

Regrettably, MacIntosh does not elaborate on the contributions of the small cadre of military women who served. Did their OSS service have a similar impact on their military careers, or were they cast aside in the great post-war drawdown? Unfortunatley, MacIntosh was not able to borrow more extensively from her interviews—in the style of Ambrose. The mundane bulk of the women's labors produced different kinds of memories.

The book is highly readable and enjoyable. It truly makes me wish I could personally meet MacIntosh. She is a great American and has served her country well in war and peace. She sounds like a great lady, and judging from her book, she is not the exception within the "sisterhood of spies."

LTC Dianne Smith, ***AFCENT, Brunssum, Netherlands***

INTO THE CRUCIBLE: Making Marines for the 21st Century by James B. Woulfe. 183 pages. Presidio Press, Novato, CA. 1998. $24.95.

Recruit training for all branches of the US military services had a rude awakening in 1965 when several recruits died during rigorous training exercises. Congress demanded change, and all branches responded accordingly. Each service paid more attention to selection and training of drill instructors and the nature of the recruit curriculum. *Into the Crucible* describes how the US Marine Corps is adapting its training to place recruits under maximum stress before



graduation. The exercise worthily climaxes the preparation to become a Marine. The Corps terms this short stress test "the crucible."

The crucible is a series of physically demanding, simulated combat scenarios a platoon must complete together. This phase of recruit training emphasizes problem solving, team building and the Corps' special elan by associating the course's physical challenges with the Corps' history.

Each test problem is named after a Marine recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor. The drill instructor relates solutions to problems with the exploits for which that Marine demonstrated extraordinary bravery. The message is clear: this is your role model. The leadership role in problem solving rotates throughout the platoon. Such techniques are also widely used in business and managerial training since being introduced 50 years ago by the Outward Bound Program.

The simulated combat scenarios use walls, barrels, real barbed wire and overhead machinegun fire. However, strips of sawdust simulate rivers and other physical ground features, for swamps and real rivers caused the deaths of recruits in the past. The students carry full packs, endure long hikes, little food and an almost total lack of sleep. There is no doubt the course is a maximum-stress operation.

James B. Woulfe's remarkably naïve writing style is irritating at first but effectively provides the instruction's flavor as well as the content. A hypothetical platoon of ethnically mixed recruits headed by a battle-wise Marine sergeant is the focus of the contrived experience. The trainees possess a sensible mix of competence. Some are awkward, others agile, some bright, others less so. The platoon achieves its goal with most of the obstacles, fails in a few, and after-action reviews consider the reason for failures. Such techniques could almost be lifted from a Harvard Business School managerial curriculum.

The experience is presented in the form of conversation between the drill instructor and the recruits, but it is palpably contrived and clearly not intended to be realistic. The artificial narrative merely demonstrates how drill instructors should encourage dialogue.

It is appropriate for the Marine Corps to teach recruits its policies concerning drugs, honesty and discipline. But it is a stretch to believe that Marine recruits engaged in a maximum-effort, 45-mile hike, interspersed with other physical challenges will be receptive to lectures on family values, marriage, divorce, sexual harassment and ethnic discrimination. Unfortunately, the author intersperses his narrative with such homilies. The most effective venue for such spiritual and political training is scarcely among a bunch of tired, wet, dirty, hungry Marine recruits whose feet hurt and who only wish to complete the operation so they can relax in a hot shower.

The crucible experiment is unique in its emphasis on problem solving by every member of a recruit platoon. It presumes that even those who will primarily be followers will benefit from understanding leaders' responsibilities. It prepares recruits to meet the unexpected challenges that occur in combat. If we are to believe Woulfe, the exercise reinforces the ethos of the Marine Corps by recalling its proud history—a theme constantly repeated during previous weeks of boot camp.

It is fitting that the commandant of the Corps, Charles C. Krulak, who sponsored this variant in recruit

training, is the son of a previous commandant, General Victor "Brute" Krulak. Recruit training under "Brute" was characterized by a Marine drill instructor wearing a flat hat and thrusting his chin an inch or less from the terrified eyes of a young recruit. It will be difficult to measure whether the crucible is better training for a combat Marine, but society and the nature of future wars make it logical to find better ways of training recruits for future challenges.

RADM Benjamin Eiseman,
USNR, Retired,
Denver, Colorado



CONFEDERATE TIDE RISING: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 1861-1862, by Joseph L. Harsh. 278 pages. Kent State University Press, Kent, OH. 1998. $35.00.

Scholars, historians and pundits have long been at odds over whether the Confederacy ever had a cogent strategy for winning the Civil War. If it did, who was responsible for creating and articulating it as a Southern national policy? Now, backed by superb research and keen analysis, Joseph Harsh's first book, *Confederate Tide Rising*, presents a sharply focused study of the South's strategy at the war's beginning.

Harsh is a professor of history at Virginia's George Mason University and the founding president of the Northern Virginia Association of Historians. Initially, he was interested in why Confederate General Robert E. Lee took his army across the Potomac River and invaded Maryland in 1862, a decidedly risky and aggressive move that seemed contrary to the South's strategic circumstances and limited resources. What Harsh found compelled him to write this vivid study of Southern war aims, policy and strategy and of the relationship between Confederate President Jefferson Davis and Lee.

At first, Davis favored an offensive defense to protect Southern independence and territorial integrity while embracing all slave states within the Confederacy, especially the undeclared Border States. However, given the South's limited manpower and materiel, it soon became clear that the South could not win a war of attrition while standing on a perimeter defense. The war aims far exceeded the resources available.

Although the South at first achieved some significant successes, severe setbacks begged for a change in the South's strategic vision. Kentucky had been lost; Tennessee was almost lost; Union forces had captured New Orleans, penetrated Mississippi and threatened Charleston; General George McClellan's huge Union army was only 25 miles from Richmond. By late May 1862, the South had nearly lost the war.

Davis has been criticized for his strategy of perimeter defense and for meddling with his field commanders. Harsh convincingly contends, however, that while Davis was an exceptionally strong war president, he largely confined himself to offering general guidance to his commanding generals. He expected them to create their own strategies within the framework of his guidance.

In 1862, when Lee assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia, Davis found the right partner for developing a viable Southern strategy. Davis, the statesman, and Lee, the soldier, knew the South's chances for victory were slim. They realized that coordination, concentration and aggressive operations were key factors for any winning strategy, and they were well aware their odds of winning would increase if the North failed to properly use all of its resources and energies. If the North grew weary of the war, it might abandon the effort as too costly in money and blood.

Lee especially knew offense offered the only path to victory. Defense would only prolong the inevitability of defeat. Only the offense allows a force to seize and maintain the initiative; choose the time, place and manner of battle; inflict maximum punishment on the enemy; and create a sense of invincibility and control of events. Lee's subsequent offensive operations drove McClellan back and crushed General John Pope's army at the Second Battle of Manassas. Harsh argues that the Maryland invasion was a calculated risk that fit nicely into the South's overall strategy to take the war to Northern territory.

Harsh's crisp narrative of moves and countermoves contains excellent insights about translating strategy and policy into maneuver and tactics. His well-presented argument and credible conclusion offer a sound perspective on this often-misunderstood feature of the war.

COL William D. Bushnell,
USMC, Retired,
Sebascodegan Island, Maine

CGSC Notes

continued from back cover

seeks to identify and locate surviving Korean War veterans to facilitate their participation in 50th-anniversary commemorative activities. Former Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps General Raymond G. Davis, a Korean War Medal of Honor recipient and foundation co-chairman, remarked: "We do not seek to commemorate the war, but rather the veterans thereof and the sacrifices they made to preserve democracy on the Korean peninsula almost 50 years ago."

Additional information and registration forms are available from the foundation's web site <www.uskorea2000.org>. Individuals may also request an information and registration packet from US-Korea 2000 Foundation, Inc., 4600 Duke Street, Suite 416, Alexandria, VA 22304-2517. Please include name and complete mailing address. You may also contact the foundation by calling (703) 212-8128, faxing (703) 684-0193 or E-mailing <Info@USKorea2000.org>.

The foundation is a private, publicly supported, nonprofit organization serving the Korean War veteran community through individual and corporate philanthropic outreach. For more information on helping financially or assisting in other ways, please contact Deputy Executive Director Harry Mohr at the numbers listed above, or you can E-mail him at <HMohr@USKorea2000.org>.

Korea Bound?

American Forces Press Service has established a website to showcase US Forces Korea (USFK). The site presents articles, photos, maps and video clips on such topics as the USFK mission, history of US involvement in Korea and an overview of what service members should expect during a tour of duty in Korea. The site is at <www.defenselink.mil/specials/korea/>.

MR Letters

Not THAT Dull

I read the article "Threat Convergence" by LTC Bill Flynt (*MR*, September-October 99) with interest. The picture of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh reminded me of the salmonella poisoning incident that hit too close to home when I was a high school freshman in The Dalles, Oregon. No one in my family became ill due to the poisoning, but many of my friends did.

When I first noticed that the author spelled my hometown "The Dulles," I felt slighted. Then I chuckled and wondered whether the author had actually been there. The Dalles is a small town of 12,000, and a visitor not interested in outdoor activities might indeed think that "The Dulles" is more appropriate.

CPT Heather Green,
141st Support Battalion,
Oregon ARNG

Editor's Note

Some *MR* readers objected to LTC Bill Flynt's discussion of cults in "Threat Convergence." The term "cult" refers to a group—Christian, Jewish, Muslim, pagan or other sect—outside the religious mainstream. Title X of the US Code assures soldiers their constitutional religious liberties, whether or not their beliefs are popular. ***MR***